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Case No. 1-15-CV-275833 JOYCE BARTHOLOMEW, 12 
13 Plaintiff. 
ORDER RE: DEMURRER 14 vs. 
15 
16 YOUTUBE, LLC, 
17 
Defendant, 
18 
19 
The demurrer by defendant YouTube, LLC to the complaint of plaintiff Joyce 
Bartholomew came on for hearing before the Honorable Joseph H. Huber on April 16, 2015, at 
9:00 a.m. in Department 21. The matter having been submitted, after full consideration of the 
authorities, papers, and arguments submitted by each party, and the hearing, the Court makes the 
following rulings: 
Plaintiff Joyce Bartholomew ("Plaintiff) is a private musician who creates and publishes 
original Christian ministry music. (Complaint, 7.) In 2013, Plaintiff composed and recorded a 
song entitled "What Was Your Name" (the "Song"), and produced an original music video for 
the Song (the "Video"). (Complaint, 8-10.) Plaintiff also created a YouTube account and 
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1 became bound by defendant YouTube, LLC's ("YouTube") Terms of Service. (Complaint, ^[11, 
2 Ex. 1 [setting forth the Terms of Service].) On January 14, 2014, Plaintiff uploaded a copy of 
3 the Video to her YouTube account and the Video was assigned a public Uniform Resource 
Locator ("URL"). (Complaint, ^ 12-14.) 4 
By the end of April 2014, the Video had received approximately 30,000 views. 
"6 CCompIaiht7^T77~Aroundlhe same time, the Video was removecTbyTMTube. (Complaint, *f~ 
1 18.) YouTube did not deactivate or remove the URL assigned to the Video, but replaced the 
8 Video with the image of a distressed face and the following written statement (the "Statement"); 
9 "This video has been removed because its content violated YouTube's Terms of Service." 
10 (Complaint, ^19, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the "Statement ... is also a link that could be 
11 clicked by readers" and "[w]hen the Statement is clicked, the reader is taken to the subsection of 
12 a new page titled'Community Guideline Tips'...." (Complaint, 20-21.) The "Community 
13 Guideline Tips" subsection—which is located on the second page of a two page document 
14 entitled "YouTube Community Guidelines"— states; "Want a little more insight into the limits 
15 and exceptions in the Community Guidelines? Here are some helpful examples and tips; ...." 
16 (Complaint, f 22, Ex. 5.) Beneath this text is a list of the following categories, which can be 
17 expanded to reveal further information: sex and nudity; hate speech; shocking and disgusting; 
18 dangerous illegal acts; children; copyright; privacy; harassment; impersonation; and threats. 
19 (Complaint, ^ 22, Exs. 5 and 9.) 
After the Video was removed. Plaintiffs counsel contacted YouTube and requested that 
21 the "alleged violation be removed and [the] video restored." (Complaint, 27.) YouTube 
22 responded to Plaintiffs counsel in writing and advised that the Video was in violation of 
23 YouTube's Terms of Service section 4(H), which states; "You agree not to use or launch any 
24 automated system, including without limitation, 'robots,' 'spiders,' or 'offline readers,' that 
25 accesses the Service in a manner that sends more request messages to the YouTube servers in a 
26 given period of time than a human can reasonably produce in the same period using a 
27 conventional on-line web browser." (Complaint, 28, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff s counsel then requested 
28 that YouTube produce the evidence that it relied upon in coming to its decision that the Video 
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violated the Terms of Service, but YouTube refused to do so on privacy grounds. (Complaint, Y\\ 
2 30-31.) 
Plaintiff alleges that YouTube's Statement—that the Video was removed because its 
4 content violated the Terms of Service—is false because; section 4(H) of the Terms of Service 
5 "does not concern the content of videos uploaded to YouTube"; "Plaintiff never violated, or 
~5 assisted m violating, any section withm"YouTube^ s Terms of Service, or participated in any other 
7 activity in violation of YouTube's rules"; and "[t]he Video's content, created by Plaintiff, ... 
8 does not violate YouTube's Terms of Service" or "fit within any of the categories of content 
9 which violate YouTube's Terms of Service." (Complaint, ^ 29, 33, and 36-37.) Plaintiff also 
10 alleges that "YouTube falsely described the content of the Video as containing: sex and nudity; 
11 hate speech; shocking and disgusting acts; dangerous acts; inappropriate use of children; 
12 copyright infringements; privacy violations; harassment; impersonation; or threats." (Complaint, 
13 24.) Plaintiff further alleges that the "public writings" published by YouTube are libelous per 
14 se because: they impute a want of character on Plaintiff; they impute a violation of the Terms of 
15 Service by Plaintiff; they impute the creation and public posting of videos by Plaintiff that 
16 concern sex and nudity, hate speech, shocking and disgusting acts, dangerous illegal acts, 
17 inappropriate use of children, copyright infringements, privacy violations, harassment, 
18 impersonation, and/or threats. (Complaint, ^ 39-42.) 
On January 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint against YouTube, alleging a 
20 single cause of action for libel per se. 
Currently before the Court is YouTube's demurrer to the complaint on the ground of 
22 failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for libel per se. (See Code Civ. 
o 
19 
21 
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) 23 
24 L Legal Standard 
"In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by 
long settled rules. 'We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but 
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We also consider matters which may­
be judicially noticed.'" {Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,318.) "A demurrer tests only 
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1 the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the 
2 complaint; the question of plaintiffs ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty 
3 in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court." {Committee on Children's 
4 Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,213-214.) 
5 il. YouTube's Request for Judicial Notice 
YouTube's request for judicial notice of the Order Re: U^fendant^MTube^lTlJC'T" 
7 Demurrer to the Complaint filed in the case of Lewis v. YouTuhe, LLC (Santa Clara County 
8 Superior Court, Case No. 1-13-CV-256300) is DENIED. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. 
9 Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [only relevant matters are subject to 
10 judicial notice].) 
6 
III. Libel Per Se 11 
YouTube argues that the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action for libel per se for two reasons: (1) the Statement is not false; and (2) the Statement is not 
defamatory on its face. With respect to the issue of falsity, YouTube asserts that the Statement is 
true because the term "content"—as defined by the Terms of Service—includes text and, thus, its 
determination that the view count for the Video had been artificially inflated was a determination 
that the content of the Video violated the Terms of Service. With respect to the issue of whether 
the Statement is defamatory, YouTube asserts that the Statement is not defamatory on its face 
because: no reasonable reader would perceive a meaning in the Statement that would expose • 
Plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, cause her to be shunned or avoided, or have a 
tendency to injure her in her occupation; the Statement does not mention Plaintiff; Plaintiffs 
attempt to utilize the contents of the "Community Guideline Tips" to infuse the Statement with 
defamatory meaning is improper innuendo and reference to extrinsic material; and, even if the 
"Community Guideline Tips" are considered in determining whether the Statement is defamatory 
on its face, a reasonable reader would not conclude that YouTube was implying that the Video 
was removed because it contained the specific kinds of improper content mentioned in the 
"Community Guideline Tips." 
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Conversely, Plaintiff argues that the Statement is false because the purported violation— 
2 that the view count for the Video was artificially inflated in violation of YouTube's Terms of 
3 Service section 4(H)—did not involve the actual content of the Video itself. Plaintiff further 
4 argues that the Statement is defamatory on its face because: it is not necessary for the Statement 
5 to directly mention her as the attack on her character is implied; the link to the "Community 
1 
6 Guideline Tips" subsection was offered to readers as a means of explaining the Statement and^ 
7 consequently, the "Community Guideline Tips" subsection was incorporated into the Statement; 
8 a reasonable reader would infer that the Statement and "Community Guideline Tips" were 
9 related and the Video contained the type of content identified in the enumerated examples set 
10 forth in the "Community Guideline Tips." 
"Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other 
12 fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or 
13 obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in 
14 his occupation." (Civ. Code, § 45.) Libel is either per se or per quod and each requires a 
15 different standard of pleading. {Palm Springs Tennis Club v. Range! (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1, 5­
16 6.) "If no reasonable reader of a publication could impute to a statement therein a meaning 
17 which tended to harm the reputation of the plaintiff in any of the respects enumerated in Civil 
18 Code section 45, then there is no libel at all. If... the defamatory meaning would appear only to 
19 readers who might be able to recognize it through some knowledge of specific facts and/or 
20 circumstances, not discernible from the face of the publication, and which are not matters of 
21 common knowledge rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then the libel ... will be 
22 libel per quod." {Id.) "A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of 
23 explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact," is said to be a libel 
24 per se. (Civ. Code § 45a.) "A statement can also be libelous per se if it contains a charge by 
25 implication from the language employed by the speaker and a listener could understand the 
26 defamatory meaning without the necessity of knowing extrinsic explanatory matter." (Wong v. 
27 Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) "The question whether a statement is defamatory can 
28 be reached on demurrer as a matter of law." {Polygram Records, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1985) 170 
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Cal.App.3d 543, 551; Cameron v. Wernick (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 890, 893 ["The initial 
2 determination as to whether a publication on its face is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory 
3 meaning is one of law."].) 
Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts establishing that the Statement was false. YouTube's 
5 assertion that the Court should interpret the term "content" as defined in its Terms of Service is 
~6 unpersuasive. Language must be given the natural and popular construction offhe average 
7 reader, and not the critical analysis of a mind trained in technicalities. {Western Broadcast Co. v. 
4 
Times-Mirror Co. (1936) 14 Cal. App. 2d 120, 124; Bates v. Campbell (1931) 213 Cal. 438. 441-8 
9 442.) Given the natural and popular construction of the average reader, the term "content" as 
10 used in the Statement refers to the actual content of the Video itself, not "Content" as defined by 
11 section 2(A) of the Terms of Service. (See Complaint, Ex. 1, section 2(A) [defining "Content" 
12 as the "text, software, scripts, graphics, photos, sounds, music, videos, audiovisual, 
13 combinations, interactive features and other materials ... [that a user] may view on, access 
14 through, or contribute to [any and all aspects of YouTube]."].) Even assuming arguendo, that 
15 the term "content" as utilized in the Statement encompasses the view count meter on the Video, 
16 Plaintiff still pleads sufficient facts establishing that the Statement was false because she alleges 
17 she did not violate the Terms of Service and the Video's content did not violate the Terms of 
Service. (Complaint, f 37.) 
Nonetheless, Plaintiff does not plead facts establishing that the Statement was defamatory 
on its face. First, "[d]efamatory words to be actionable must refer to some ascertained or 
ascertainable person, and that person must be plaintiff." (Vedovi v. Watson & Taylor (1930) 104 
Cal. App. 80, 83.) It is not necessary for the plaintiff to be mentioned by name if the words used 
in describing the person meant can be shown to have referred to him and have been so 
understood. {Id.) Here, the Statement contains a single innocuous sentence that does not 
mention or reference Plaintiff in any way. Moreover, the Statement does not describe any 
individual whatsoever, but merely states that the Video was removed because its content violated 
YouTube's Terms of Service. Most importantly, no reasonable reader would perceive a meaning 
in the Statement that would expose Plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, cause her 
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1 to be shunned or avoided, or have a tendency to injure her in her occupation. The Statement 
2 functions as a mere notice to individuals attempting to view the Video that the Video was 
3 removed because its content violated YouTube's Term of Service; it does not imply that the 
4 Video was removed as a result of Plaintiffs conduct, let alone conduct by Plaintiff that would 
5 subject her to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, cause her to be shunned or avoided, or have 
6 a tendency to injure her irTher occupation. (See Vedovi v. Watson cSTTaylor (T9j0)TO4"CalTApp. 
7 80, 84-85, 87-88 [in an action for libel, based on a notice of cancellation of an insurance policy 
8 for nonpayment of a premium, which was sent to a client of the plaintiff after the plaintiff had 
9 collected the premium and paid it to the defendant less his brokerage, the notice was not libelous 
10 per se, where there was nothing in the notice itself, especially in the absence of a reference to the 
11 plaintiff or any charge made against him, which exposed him to hatred, contempt, ridicule or 
12 obloquy, or which caused him to be shunned or avoided, or which had a tendency to injure him 
13 in his occupation].) 
Second, the fact that the Statement was also a link that could be clicked by readers and, if 
15 clicked, would direct readers to the "Community Guideline Tips" subsection is an extrinsic fact, 
16 not evident on the face of the Statement, that is necessary for Plaintiffs alleged defamatory 
17 meaning to appear. If a reader did not click on the link (i.e., if the reader was not aware of the 
18 extrinsic explanatory matter), he or she would not be able to understand the defamatory meaning 
19 alleged by Plaintiff. {Wong v. Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354,1369 ["A statement can also 
20 be libelous per se if it contains a charge by implication from the language employed by the 
21 speaker and a listener could understand the defamatory meaning without the necessity of 
22 knowing extrinsic explanatory matter"} [emphasis added].) Similarly, the contents of the 
23 "Community Guideline Tips" subsection are extrinsic facts and innuendo that are necessary to 
24 understand the defamatory meaning alleged by Plaintiff. Since these extrinsic facts and 
25 innuendo are necessary to understand the defamatory meaning of the Statement as alleged by 
26 Plaintiff, the Statement is not libelous per se. (See MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 
14 
52 Cal.2d 536, 548-550; see also McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 27 
97,112 ["Lyons's statement was on its face nondefamatory—she stated McGarry was '"not 28 
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1 involved to our knowledge in any criminal activity.' It could only have been understood in a 
2 defamatory sense if the listener was aware that the question preceding her response had asked if 
3 McGarry had been involved in criminal or moral offenses. Because the listener was required to 
4 have 'knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the publication, which are not 
5 matters of common knowledge rationally attributable to all reasonable persons' [Citation], the 
"~5 statement may well be only defamatory per quod and require pleading and proof of special 
7 damages. [Citation.]"].) Notably, Plaintiff cites no legal authority supporting her position that 
8 the contents of the "Community Guideline Tips" subsection was incorporated into the Statement 
9 by virtue of the fact that the Statement contained a hyperlink to the "Community Guideline Tips" 
10 subsection. 
Third, assuming arguendo that the "Community Guideline Tips" subsection is not 
explanatory matter, a reasonable reader would not fairly infer from the Statement and the 
"Community Guideline Tips" subsection that the Video was removed because it contained the 
specific kinds of improper content mentioned in the "Community Guideline Tips" subsection. 
The Statement states that the Video's content violated YouTube's Terms of Service, which is 
different from YouTube's Community Guidelines. Furthermore, even though a reasonable 
reader may have inferred that the Video also violated the Community Guidelines given that the 
Statement linked to the "Community Guideline Tips" subsection, a reasonable reader would not 
infer that the Video contained the specific kinds of improper content mentioned in the 
"Community Guideline Tips" subsection because the subsection explicitly states that the 
categories listed are merely examples set forth to provide readers with further insight into the 
Community Guidelines. It is readily apparent that the examples set forth in the subsection do not 
constitute an exhaustive list of the type of content that violates YouTube's Community 
Guidelines. Notably, as YouTube points out, if a reader was to scroll up from the subsection to 
the first page of the "Community Guidelines" document, he or she would see that spam and 
misleading descriptions, tags, titles, or thumbnails used to increase views are also content that 
violates the "Community Guidelines." (See Complaint, Ex. 9, p. 1.) 
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1 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for libel 
2 per se. Moreover, as Plaintiff also fails to plead any special damages, she fails to state a claim 
3 for libel per quod. 
Accordingly, the demurrer to the complaint is SUSTAINED, with 10 days' leave to 4 
5 amend. 
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April 2015 10 
11 APR 1 6 2015 
Joseph H. Huber 12 
Judge of the Superior Court 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 
191 N. First Street 
95113-1090 San Jose, CA 
(ENDORSED) 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
ORDER RE: DEMURRER 
was delivered to the parties listed below in the above entitled case as set 
forth in the sworn declaration below. 
Parties/Attorneys of Record: 
CC: Charles S LiMandri , Law Offices Of Charles Limandri 
P.O.BOX 9120, Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067 
David H. Kramer , Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
650 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304 
If you, a party represented by you, or a witness to be called on behalf of that party need an accommodation under the American with 
(408)882-2690 or Disabilities Act, please contact the Court Administrator's office at (408)882-2700, or use the Court's TDD line 
the Voice/TDD California Relay Service, (800)735-2922. 
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL: I declare that I served this notice by enclosing a true copy in a sealed envelope, addressed to each 
person whose name is shown above, and by depositing the envelope with postage fully prepaid, in the United States Mail at 
DAVID H. YAMASAKI, Chief Executive Officer/Clerk by Sylvia Roman, Deputy San Jose, CA on 04/17/15. 
